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Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer Taxation
Jennifer Bird-Pollan*
This article is the third in a series examining the continued
relevance and philosophical legitimacy of the United States
wealth transfer tax system from within a particular
philosophical perspective. The article examines the
utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and his philosophical progeny
and distinguishes the philosophical approach of utilitarianism
from contemporary welfare economics, primarily on the basis of
the concept of "utility" in each approach. After explicating the
utilitarian criteria for ethical action, the article goes on to think
through what Mill's utilitarianism says about the taxation of
wealth and wealth transfers, the United States federal wealth
transfer tax system as it stands today, and what structural
changes might improve the system under a utilitarian
framework.
1. INTRODUCTION
A nation's tax laws can be seen as its manifested
distributive justice ideals. While it is clear that the United
States' Tax Code contains a variety of provisions aimed at
particular non-distributive justice goals,' underneath the political
rhetoric and backroom deals, our tax and transfer systems
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1. These goals range from the basic goals of revenue raising and the funding of
government projects to incentive goals encouraging such things as the purchase of business
equipment, the provision of employee health insurance by employers, or the installation of
solar panels in residential homes. 26 U.S.C. § § 25D, 106, 179 (2012).
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embody (or should embody) the model of distributive justice
that we as a nation have endorsed.2 Unfortunately, these ideals
often get lost or smothered under political debates. Even if it
were possible to understand a nation's fundamental distributive
justice goals, pushing those goals through the political sausage-
making machine makes it difficult to identify the foundational
beliefs in the resulting legislation.3 One of the problems of
seeing tax law as a manifestation of distributive justice is that in
a nation as large as the United States, it is difficult to argue that
the nation as a whole has one coherent set of distributive justice
beliefs.' Indeed, it would be absurd to make such a claim in
2016, when the country appears more politically divided than it
has ever been.'
Because of the political differences among the
contemporary American citizenry, lawmakers ought to consider
any tax policy proposals (indeed, policy proposals of any kind)
from the perspectives of the major political views endorsed by
the citizenry. In an attempt to contribute to this discussion, this
article is the third in a series that examines the United States'
federal wealth transfer taxes from the perspective of a particular
set of beliefs about distributive justice. Distributive justice asks
2. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1996).
3. There is much written about the complexity of the Code and about the structural
reasons our legislative process often results in such messy rules. One cynical interpretation
of this is that "[i]f Congress were to bind itself to make no major changes in tax law during
the next congressional session-or ever again-the contributions would start to dry up,
these members' lunch and dinner invitations would taper off, and so on." JOEL SLEMROD
& JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES
171 (4th ed. 2008).
4. Even when the review of arguments for distributive justice is limited to academic
theories, it remains difficult to articulate a coherent view of the "right" distributive justice
outcome. It is the lack of intellectual coherence on equity questions that results in the view
that equity is less important than efficiency. James R. Repetti, Democracy and
Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity,61 VAND. L. REV. 1129,1131 (2008).
5. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC:
How INCREASING IDEOLOGICAL UNIFORMITY AND PARTISAN ANTIPATHY AFFECT
POLITICS, COMPROMISE AND EVERYDAY LIFE 6-7 (2014), http://www.people-
press.org/ 2 014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
[https://perma.cc/GC45-4JSA].
6. See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of Opportunity,
and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 713, 713 (2014) (proposing that an
inheritance or accessions tax best fits the Rawlsian philosophy of equality of opportunity,
which is at the heart of much American thought) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Unseating
Privilege]; Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick,
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whether any particular distribution of wealth within a society is
more just than another, or whether justice demands a
redistribution of the current state of wealth distribution.
Thinking about the American citizenry's views of distributive
justice can inform tax policy decisions and help legislators draft
tax rules that most accurately reflect the wishes of the
population they represent. Democracy, of course, is meant to
elicit the views of a majority of the citizens, and then enact those
views as a series of laws.' However, even if we believed our
democracy did that effectively, it would still mean that,
potentially, a sizable minority of citizens would not necessarily
have their political beliefs reflected in the nation's laws.
Because the United States is not comprised entirely of
people who share one set of philosophical beliefs,' in this series
of articles I consider some of the most commonly endorsed
philosophical belief systems, and then examine one important
element of the federal tax system- the wealth transfer taxes-
through the lens of that belief system. My work uses wealth
transfer taxes rather than the income tax to consider the
consequences of those belief systems, both because wealth
transfer taxation is more purely the site of redistribution in the
Code and because the U.S. federal income tax does significant
work beyond redistribution.10  This combination of factors
Libertarianism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (exploring the estate tax
from the perspective of Robert Nozick's libertarian philosophical viewpoint) [hereinafter
Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Propertyl.
7. See Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 6, at 22.
8. See, e.g., Democracy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
9. Indeed, if one examines recent elections within the United States, one might
conclude that philosophical (and political) beliefs are more diametrically opposed than they
have ever been. See PEw RESEARCH CTR., supra note 5, at 6.
10. The U.S. federal income tax is the location of significant policy-making in this
country, in addition to being the source of satisfaction of most revenue-raising goals.
Gerald Prante & Scott Hodge, The Distribution of Tax and Spending Policies in the United
States, TAX FOUND., http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/SR211.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BVZ4-6N2T]. Through the use of tax expenditure programs (so-called
"government spending"), the Code creates incentives for particular behavior. STANLEY S.
SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1, 3 (1985). Furthermore, the
income tax generates the vast majority of federal revenues. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE
2016 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 53 (2016),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/1 14th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-LTBO-
2.pdf (providing a long-term budget outlook up to 2046) [https://perma.cc/GM8F-89FZ].
For these reasons, among others, discussion of the wealth transfer taxes, rather than the
income tax, provides space for a more explicit examination of the philosophical reasons for
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makes the United States federal wealth transfer tax system a
uniquely interesting place to examine the way in which
particular distributive justice ideals, which seem to be endorsed
by the American populace, are (or are not) manifested in law. A
loose form of utilitarianism (the judgment that the best action is
the one that maximizes overall "utility" to the greatest degree) is
an extremely popular view in contemporary American politics."
Individuals on both sides of the political aisle make utilitarian
arguments in support of their views.12 In particular the language
of "increasing the pie" appears in discussions of tax reform and
debates about social welfare programs, regardless of the
speakers' belief about how that newly expanded pie should be
allocated." While discussions of this growing pie are often
Rawlsian in nature,14 there is a distinctly utilitarian bent to such
discussions as well, since more pie means more utility, making
choices that produce more value for more people the appropriate
choices under a utilitarian model." This utilitarian language,
manifested primarily in twenty-first century debates as the
language of economics, exercises significant authority in
taxation. For a more robust discussion of why this project focuses on wealth transfer taxes
rather than on income taxes, see Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 6,
especially Part II.
11. See generally Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse:
Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 363, 406
(2002) (noting that many political conflicts in the United States arise in part due to "the
utility maximizing preferences of a majority of the population.").
12. See Russell Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 48-49
(1986) (arguing "morally defensible rights" are grounded in utilitarian concepts); John
Lawrence Hill, A Theory of Merit, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 30 (2002) (asserting that
"contemporary thinking on the right is broadly utilitarian in its commitments"); Michael D.
Stark, Millian Republicans v. Benthamian Democrats (November 12, 2012),
https://michaeldstark.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/millian-republicans-v-benthamian-
democrats/ [https://perma.cc/6NAZ-5YDL].
13. In an editorial discussion of tax reform, former FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair (a
self-proclaimed conservative Republican) described the Republicans as "a party that prides
itself on increasing the pie, not redividing it." Sheila C. Blair, Grand Old Parity, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A25.
14. Jason Brennan, Rawl's Distributive Justice,
https://www.libertarianism.org/guides/lectures/rawlss-distributive-justice
[https://perma.cc/4YTA-9ZXL] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
15. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 1363, 1366 (2004) (assuming that "improving aggregate social welfare, as measured
by the individual utility levels or happiness of the population, remains one important goal
of tax policy.").
contemporary political discussions.1 6 In this article, I take up
classical utilitarianism, in particular as articulated by John Stuart
Mill, and apply it to an analysis of the United States' wealth
transfer tax regime.
Utilitarianism has been adopted and transformed in
contemporary political theory into welfare economics." In this
article, I will demonstrate why a consideration of classical
utilitarianism, in its most philosophically rigorous manifestation,
can offer something beyond the traditional welfare economics
arguments. Further, I will show that Mill's utilitarianism is
consistent with a robust, heavily redistributive, wealth transfer
tax system. This article should not be taken as an endorsement
of the utilitarian position. Rather, I explicate classical
utilitarianism and then adopt it for purposes of the article in
order to apply its precepts to an examination of the taxation of
wealth transfers.
The structure of the article proceeds as follows: Part I
introduces the problem and the structure of the article. Part II
explains the history and current state of wealth transfer taxation
in the United States. Part III articulates the classical utilitarian
ethical theory, its adaptation into the theory of welfare
economics, and the important distinctions between the two
approaches. Part IV applies classical utilitarianism to an
evaluation of the taxation of wealth transfers. Part V concludes.
II. THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM
A. History of the System
The United States wealth transfer tax system has three
elements: the estate tax, the gift tax, and the generation-skipping
transfer (GST) tax." In place since 1916, the estate tax is the
16. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: Problems
and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485, 1487 n.8 (2014).
17. For a further discussion of this claim, see infra note 60.
18. Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the Federal
Wealth Transfer System (March 18, 2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=47 4 4 , at 1-3
[https://perma.cc/U5V6-LJLR]. The federal estate tax (a tax on transfers made to surviving
heirs at the death of the donor) was first enacted in the United States in 1916. Id. at 5. The
first estate tax was enacted without an accompanying gift tax. Id. at 6. As a result, the tax
could easily be avoided if the donor transferred the majority of her assets tax-free during
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central component of the system and imposes an excise tax on
the transfer of wealth at death.19 The federal gift tax serves as a
backstop to the estate tax, ensuring that wealth transferred
during the donor's lifetime, rather than held until death, will also
be subjected to the imposition of the tax.20 The GST tax
imposes another layer of tax on gratuitous transfers (either
during lifetime or after death) made to recipients more than one
generation removed from the donor.2 1
The year 2016 marks the 100th anniversary of the estate
tax. Tracing the history of the tax demonstrates a remarkable
shrinking of the tax over time.22 Throughout their history, the
wealth transfer taxes have been assessed against varying
percentages of the population. At their peak in 1976, eight
percent of adult deaths resulted in estates that were subject to the
23estate tax. In 2011 an estimated 0.13% of adult deaths resulted
in estates that were subject to the tax.24 In terms of total tax
her lifetime, rather than waiting until death to pass on her wealth. Id. at 5. Congress
realized that the estate tax was nearly powerless without a gift tax, and, as a result, the first
gift tax (a tax on gratuitous transfers made during the donor's lifetime) was enacted in 1924
but repealed in 1926. Id. at 6. The modern gift tax was enacted in 1932, and the United
States has had both gift and estate taxes since then, with the exception of the one-year
repeal of the estate tax in 2010. Id. at 6, 10. The GST tax, imposed to ensure that wealth
transfer taxation cannot be avoided by making a transfer to an heir who is not an immediate
descendant of the transferor, was first enacted in 1976 and has been in place in its current
form since 1986. Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate
Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 118, 118-24 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HR-E2WE].
19. Id. at 118. The estate tax is imposed at a current rate of forty percent on amounts
in excess of the 2014 unified credit exemption equivalent amount of $5,340,000. 26
U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (2012); Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 12.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). The Code imposes an excise tax on the gratuitous
transfer of wealth during the donor's lifetime if the transfer exceeds the lifetime unified
credit exemption equivalent amount of $5,340,000. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra
note 18, at 12. The gift tax is statutorily linked to the estate tax, so the tax is imposed at the
rate of forty percent in 2014. 26 U.S.C. § 2001.
21. The Code imposes a tax (in addition to taxes imposed under § 2001 and § 2501)
on direct transfers or distributions from a trust to a "skip person." 26 U.S.C. § 2601
(2012). In addition to the unified credit against estate and gift taxes available under §
2010, there is a lifetime credit against the GST tax equivalent to an exemption amount, in
2014, of $5,340,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (2012) (referencing § 2010); Joint Committee on
Taxation, supra note 18, at 12. Transfers in excess of the exemption equivalent amount are
taxed at forty percent in 2014. 26 U.S.C. § 2602 (2012) (referencing § 2001).
22. See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 18, at 121-28.
23. Id. at 125.
24. In 2011, only 0.13% of adult deaths resulted in estates that were subject to the
estate tax. Historical Returns as Percentage of Deaths, TAX POL'Y CTR.,
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revenues collected through the wealth transfer taxes, the taxes
were at their peak in 1972, when 2.6% of total tax revenues
came from the estate and gift taxes. 25 By contrast, in 2013 estate
tax revenues represented only 0.6% of total United States federal
tax revenues.26
B. Mechanics of the United States Wealth Transfer
Taxes
The modem estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer of
wealth.27 Many (although perhaps not all) of the fundamental
goals of wealth transfer taxation could be achieved through the
imposition of a direct tax on the wealth of an individual.2 8 Such
a tax, operating like the relatively common property taxes in
place in many local tax jurisdictions, could levy a tax on the
current value of an individual's assets. A federal wealth tax
could be assessed annually or more or less frequently; it could
be either flat or graduated; it could be a tax on all holdings or
only those above a certain exemption amount; and it could be
uniform across households or vary based on age or family size.
While the many options for imposing a wealth tax might make it
seem an attractive option, a constitutional prohibition on direct
taxes that are not proportional makes a wealth tax impossible
without a constitutional amendment in the United States.29
However, the structure of the estate tax, as an indirect tax on the
act of transferring wealth, rather than a direct tax on the holding
of wealth, is permitted under the United States' constitutional
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-retums-percentage-deaths
[https://perma.cc/8G5L-B3K3].
25. Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 18, at 125.
26. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE Do FEDERAL
REVENUES COME FROM? 2 (2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasicsWhereDoFederalTaxRevs
ComeFrom_08-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JYR-BBVY].
27. "A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent
who is a citizen or resident of the United States." 26 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (2012) (emphasis
added).
28. Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 How. L. 319,
330 (2010).
29. Id. at 330. For a discussion of the possibility of a wealth tax, and specifically
exploring the use of a wealth tax as a means of funding reparations, see, e.g., id. at 330-35;
David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAx L. REV. 499
(2000) (proposing a wealth tax system).
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regime.3 0 Current law unifies the estate and gift tax so that tax is
also imposed on so-called "lifetime transfers." Wealth transfers
are taxed in the same way whether they occur before or after the
death of the transferor.3 1 In practice, the estate, gift, and GST
taxes are all imposed at a flat rate of forty percent, although the
statute imposing the tax actually includes a graduated rate
structure.32 Because of the lifetime exemption equivalent credit,
no transfers are taxed at any rate under the highest forty percent
rate. All transfers within the lower brackets are exempted from
the tax.33 Under 2016 law, a taxpayer can transfer a total of
$5.45 million tax-free during her lifetime.3 4 The current lifetime
credit can also be shared between spouses, meaning that all
married couples are entitled to a total amount of $10.9 million of
tax-free transfers.3
30. "The framing of the tax has constitutional significance: While Congress may
impose excise taxes subject only to the uniformity requirement, any direct tax on property
must be apportioned among the States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 1 & § 9, cl. 4. By
imposing the tax on the value of the taxable estate that is transferred by reason of the
decedent's death (as opposed to the value of the property in the decedent's hands just prior
to his death), the estate tax falls comfortably within the excise category." BRANT J.
HELLWIG & ROBERT T. DANFORTH, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1 (2d ed. 2013).
31. While the structure of the gift tax and the estate tax is the same, there is, in fact,
still a benefit to transferring assets during one's lifetime, due to the tax-exclusive nature of
the gift tax. The estate tax is assessed on the value of the assets held by the decedent at
death. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012). By its very nature, then, the estate tax is "tax-inclusive,"
meaning that the amount paid in tax will, itself, be subject to the tax. By contrast, the gift
tax is a tax on the amount transferred by gift. 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). Therefore, the
amount subject to the gift tax does not include the amount of the tax. For example, assume
a unified estate and gift tax rate of fifty percent. Making a post-tax transfer of $100,000
will require $200,000 of assets if the amount is transferred after death ($200,000 of assets x
fifty percent tax rate results in $100,000 tax liability, leaving $100,000 of assets for the
heir), while making an inter vivos transfer of $100,000 requires only $150,000 of assets
($100,000 gift transfer x fifty percent tax on transfer incurs $50,000 tax liability - total
amount required to make the transfer is $150,000). In that sense, inter vivos gifts are
"cheaper" to make than post-death transfers.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012) begins with a tax rate 18% on the first $10,000
transferred, and gradually climbs to the current maximum rate of 40%. However, as the
current exemption equivalent credit of $5.45 million well exceeds the bottom of the 40%
bracket (currently the 40% bracket affects transfers in excess of $1,000,000), no transfers
are subject to the tax rates in the lower brackets.
33. Id.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
35. Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. Beginning with the 2011 tax year, the
Code permitted unused portions of the lifetime credit to transfer to the surviving spouse
upon the death of the first spouse. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 11.
Before then, a significant amount of estate planning, in particular the use of so-called
"QTIP trusts" centered on ensuring that the entirety of an individual's unified credit was
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The current form of the wealth transfer tax (with a $5.45
million lifetime exemption, indexed for inflation, and a forty-
percent tax rate on transfers over that amount) arose as the result
of a political compromise in the first days of 2013.36 Legislation
passed under President George W. Bush in 2001 phased out the
estate tax with a full repeal scheduled for 20 10. Because the
legislation did not garner the requisite number of votes in
Congress to become permanent, all of the so-called "Bush tax
cuts" were sunset provisions, meaning they would disappear
from the Code on December 31, 2010 without further legislative
action.38 President Obama and the 2010 Congress enacted
legislation on December 17, 2010; however, the legislation was
merely a patch, and that legislation expired on December 31,
2012.39 Finally, on January 2, 2013, the American Taxpayer
used up, rather than allowing a portion of it to expire while the surviving spouse held assets
in excess of the unified credit amount. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012). See also HELLWIG &
DANFORTH, supra note 30, at 354-56, 374.
36. Congress and President Obama signed the American Taxpayer Relief Act
(ATRA) to avoid going over the so-called "fiscal cliff." CCH Tax Briefing, President
Signs Eleventh-Hour Agreement to Avert Fiscal Cliff (January 3, 2013),
http://tax.cchgroup.com/downloads/files/pdfs/legislation/ATPR.pdf. The agreement was
reached in the final hours of 2012, and the bill was signed into law on January 2, 2013.
Colleen Curtis, What You Need to Know about the Bipartisan Tax Agreement (January 2,
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/01/01/what-you-need-know-about-
bipartisan-tax-agreement [https://perma.cc/9RCM-9EET]. The law sets the estate tax
lifetime exemption-equivalent credit at $5 million, adjusted annually for inflation (which
brings it to $5.34 million in 2014) and sets the tax rate at a flat forty percent for amounts in
excess of that amount. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (2012). The new law does not have a
sunset date, and thus will not have to be extended by another Congressional vote.
37. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 10. Before President Bush and
the 2001 Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA), the Code provided a lifetime credit against tax of $675,000. 26 U.S.C. §
2010(b) (2012). Any transfers made, whether inter vivos or after death, that exceeded the
credit amount were taxed at fifty-five percent. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012). EGTRRA slowly
increased the lifetime credit amount and simultaneously lowered the rate, culminating in a
one-year repeal of the estate tax in 2010. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND
BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 1 (2009) [hereinafter GIFT
TAXES].
38. The peculiarities of EGTRRA resulted in a complete sunset of the law on
December 31, 2010. 2 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 239 (2009) [hereinafter
BUDGET OPTIONS].
39. Id. Congress and President Obama signed the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (the Tax Relief Act), a two-year
extension of the EGTRRA provisions, including a reinstitution of the estate tax with a $5
million lifetime credit (indexed for inflation) and a thirty-five percent rate on amounts
transferred above the credit amount. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 10-
11. That extension expired on December 31, 2012, at which point the estate and gift tax
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Relief Act (ATRA) was enacted, making changes to the wealth
transfer taxes permanent and resulting in the tax rate and
exemption amount in place today.40
In addition to amounts that are transferred as "gifts" within
the definition of the Code,4 1 taxpayers can annually transfer up
to a specific amount outside of the definition of gift, under the
annual exclusion amount.42 In 2016, a taxpayer can transfer up
to $14,000 per recipient with no obligation to report the transfer
on any tax return or pay gift tax on the transfer.4 3 Such a
transfer does not use up any of the individual's lifetime unified
credit, since amounts under the annual exclusion fall outside of
the Code's definition of "taxable gift." 44 In addition, transferors
can pay the tuition and medical expenses of any individual
without subjecting those payments to wealth transfer taxation, as
long as the payments are made directly to the provider of the
services .4' The annual exclusion was originally intended as a
simplifying mechanism, allowing "normal" family transfers
(gifts on holidays and birthdays, vacations, even a teenager's
credit and rate were scheduled to revert to 2001 levels. BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 38.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that extending the EGTRRA estate and gift tax
provisions that lowered the transfer tax rate and increased the lifetime credit amount would
have cost approximately $402 billion over the period of 2010 to 2019, as compared with
the revenue that would have been raised if EGTRRA had been allowed to expire. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2012 To 2022 34 (2012); BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 38, at 239-40. Leaving the 2009
rates and exemption levels in place would have raised a total of $420 billion (or 1.2% of
total revenues) from 2010 to 2019. See GIFT TAXES, supra note 37, at 5.
40. HELLWIG & DANFORTH, supra note 30, at 17-18.
41. Importantly, and to the chagrin of law students everywhere, the term "gift"
means something different in the gift tax regime than it does in the income tax regime. The
income tax definition of gift, resulting in an increase in wealth to the recipient that is
excluded from the recipient's income under 26 U.S.C. § 102, comes from the famous
Supreme Court case Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The Supreme Court
articulated the standard, still prevalent today, that a gift stems from "detached and
disinterested generosity" on the part of the donor. Id. at 285. By contrast, the gift tax has a
statutory definition of the term "gift" that does not investigate the donor's motives.
"Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of
the consideration shall be deemed a gift ..... 26 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (2012).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2012).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(2) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(a)-(b) (2012).
45. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(e) (2012). For a critique of the exclusion of transfers to pay
for health care and education under § 2503, see Kerry A. Ryan, Human Capital and
Transfer Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 227-29 (2010).
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first car) to pass outside of the transfer tax regime. However,
aggressive estate planning has resulted in the use of the annual
exclusion for significant cash transfers, including in the popular
Crummey Trust context .46 One suspects, however, that parents
using Crummey Trusts and other planning techniques to transfer
$14,000 per year to each of their children are likely making
those traditional "gifts" as well.47 Transfers like these would
violate both the intention and the letter of the law .4' The
combination of all of these provisions allows taxpayers to
transfer a significant amount of wealth without paying any
wealth transfer taxes, or using up any of the lifetime credit.4 9
While the wealth transfer taxes are collecting less in
revenue now than they did in prior years, 0 at least in part
because the tax rates on these transfers have been reduced" and
the exemption amount has been increased,52 the reduction in the
46. Crummey trusts, named for the first taxpayer to successfully defend the use of
this tax strategy in court, allow a contribution to a trust to qualify for the annual exclusion,
as long as the transfer satisfies certain technical requirements, used to make the transfer
more like a current transfer. For an explanation of the mechanics and uses of Crummey
trusts, see Kent A. Mason, An Analysis of Crummey and the Annual Exclusion, 65 MARQ.
L. REV. 573, 577-92 (1982).
47. Id. at 604; Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
48. Mason, supra note 46, at 604.
49. A married taxpayer with two children could transfer to her children up to
$56,000 per year outside of the transfer tax regime, by transferring $28,000 to each child
and then making an election to have half of the amount treated as being transferred from
the taxpayer's spouse. On top of that, daycare costs, private school tuition, university
tuition and fees and all medical expenses can be paid without reporting any of these
amounts on a gift tax return. Frequently Asked Questions on Gift Taxes, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/frequently-asked-questions-on-gift-taxes [https://perma.cc/4GQN-VGZ9].
50. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, supra note 26.
51. In the year 2001, the estate tax was assessed at a flat rate of fifty-five percent.
Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions, 1916-2014, TAX FOUND.
(Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates],
http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-estate-and-gift-tax-rates-exemptions-and-
exclusions-1916-2014 [https://perma.cc/9AN4-ZL7Z]. In 2016, it is only forty percent. 26
U.S.C. § 2001(c) (2012).
52. In the year 2001, the unified credit provided an exemption equivalent amount of
$675,000. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, supra note 51. In 2016, that amount is $5.45
million. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. This
exponential increase in the size of the exemption amount has taken a significant number of
estates out of the pool of estates subject to the estate tax. Ten Facts You Should Know
About the Federal Estate Tax, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 8, 2016),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/ten-facts-you-should-know-about-the-federal-
estate-tax [https://perma.cc/PG7E-NM6Q].
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collection of revenues can also be attributed, at least in part, to a
non-statutory change. Aggressive estate planning strategies
have reduced the base of the tax by reducing the value of wealth
held by taxpayers.5 Through the use of entities such as family
limited partnerships, taxpayers reduce the value for estate tax
purposes of the assets held in their estates, and since tax liability
is a product of base times rate, the reduction in the value of the
estate (the tax base) results in a reduction in overall tax
liability.54 The United States Tax Court has been relatively
sympathetic to taxpayers using aggressive estate planning
strategies, which has resulted in a dramatic decrease in estate tax
revenue.5
Given the significant evolution of the wealth transfer tax
regime in the past fifteen years, it is at best unclear what the
future of the taxation of wealth transfers in the United States
will look like. While the current legislation will not expire
without action by Congress, there is a vocal contingent of
opponents to the estate tax who fight against its continued
existence. The rhetoric of the "death tax" and the
53. Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and Adequate
Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REv. 531, 536-37 (2009).
54. A Family Limited Partnership (FLP) works by reducing the valuation of the
assets in an estate by placing those assets in a partnership and then imposing restrictions on
the partnership interests. Hellwig, supra note 53, at 535. Typically, the owner of the assets
creates a partnership, places the assets in question inside the trust, and then imposes
restrictions on the voting rights or transferability of the interests in that partnership. Id.
The creator of the partnership then transfers those partnership interests to family members
either during the transferor's lifetime, or includes an estate plan that will transfer the
partnership interests after the transferor's death. Id. Because of the restrictions placed on
the partnership interests, the transferor claims that the value of the partnership interest
should be less than the value of the proportionate share of the underlying assets. Id. at 577.
In many instances the assets included in the FLP are readily marketable assets such as
publicly traded securities. Id. at 543. However, since the assets are owned by a
partnership and there are restrictions on the partnership interests, the discounted valuation
is generally accepted by the I.R.S. Hellwig, supra note 53, at 533 n.2. "Because property
is valued on an objective basis for estate and gift tax purposes, the contribution of property
capable of ready valuation to a partnership followed by the transfer of beneficial interests
in the entity serves to suppress transfer tax value on two independent grounds. First, the
partnership interest may be discounted to reflect its lack of marketability . . . . Second, a
transferee of a limited partnership interest is not entitled to participate in management
decisions." Id. at 535-36. Discounts can be significant, sometimes nearing thirty percent.
Id. at 536.
55. Id. at 542-44.
56. For a robust analysis of the political campaign aimed at eliminating the estate tax
completely, and potentially using the elimination of the estate tax as a first step towards the
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misconception that the estate tax is the end of small business and
family farms in the United States continues to make the estate
tax unpopular, even among individuals who would never be
subject to the tax. Despite this opposition, some scholars
(perhaps overly cynically) argue that, as a political matter, the
estate tax will never be eliminated, as politicians who collect
contributions from estate tax opponents are unwilling to
sacrifice the issue completely." However, there is little
evidence that the estate tax is, in fact, inconsistent with the
political and philosophical beliefs of most Americans. In
reality, it seems the opposite is true.5 9 Part of the work of this
article and the others in this series is to demonstrate that the
continued existence of wealth transfer taxation in some form is
large-scale reduction of federal taxation generally, see generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED
WEALTH (2005) (presenting the saga of the fight over the death tax).
57. See Zachary Mider, The Estate Tax: U.S. Rich Follow Rockefeller's Lead in
Hunt for Loopholes, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-estate-tax
[https://perma.cc/M7XS-WAKK] (last updated Aug. 8, 2016); Paul Waldman, The Oddly
Unpopular Estate Tax, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://prospect.org/article/oddly-unpopular-estate-tax [https://perma.cc/S9WC-TEGW].
58. "The secret is not that special interests give boatloads of money to politicians . .
The dirty little secret I come to lay bare is that Congress likes it this way. Congress
wants there to be special interests, small groups with high stakes in what it does or does not
do. These are necessary conditions for Congress to get what it needs: money, for itself and
its campaigns . . . . For the estate tax, there are two opposing sides [to the shakedown
game]. The repeal of the tax would be a good outcome for the wealthy families in the tax's
target range and a bad outcome for the financiers and others who benefit, big time, from
the very existence of the tax and the planning it pushes many wealthy people to do. No
matter what Congress does, at least two sets of players - billionaire families on the one
hand and their estate-planning advisers and financial institutions on the other - will always
be willing to play because of the estate tax's high stakes." Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty
Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN. L. REv. 21, 21, 23 (2012).
59. "Given how clearly the estate tax lines up with American notions of fairness, it
should enjoy wider support. The beauty of a free-market system is the absence of a special
elite that judges who gets what - consumers vote with their dollars for the goods and
services that best fit their needs (at least in theory). Inherited wealth goes against this
model: As Warren Buffet has said, 'The idea that you get a lifetime of privately funded
food stamps based on coming out of the right womb strikes at my idea of fairness.' Indeed,
it's surprising that many of the same people who oppose welfare on the grounds that its
benefits are not tied to work can so stridently denounce estate taxes, thus endorsing a
system that allows people to receive vast amounts of money without putting in any work."
Stephen Martin, America's Un-American Resistance to the Estate Tax, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/resistance-estate-
tax/470403/ [https://perma.cc/77K3-RVHA].
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both philosophically important and consistent with the beliefs of
most Americans.
III. WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM?
The language of welfare economics often dominates
modem day tax policy discussions. 0 Stemming from the work
of Adam Smith, through Ricardo and Musgrave, among others,
and articulated in contemporary discussions by Louis Kaplow
and others, welfare economics arguments have a distinctly
utilitarian bent.61 Much has been written by welfare economists
about the estate tax and wealth transfer taxes, as well as about
tax policy more generally.62 If utilitarianism were nothing more
than welfare economics, this article would not be adding
significantly to the conversation. However, welfare economics
has focused on a particular aspect of utilitarianism, and has left
behind some of the unique elements of the theory that
contributed to the evolution of the ethical debate in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.63 In this Part, I will explicate
the original theory of utilitarianism as proposed first by Jeremy
Bentham and then endorsed by John Stuart Mill, including in his
treatise of the same name. I will then identify how utilitarianism
is distinct from welfare economics, and how it has evolved in
the nearly 150 years since Mill's book was published.
60. Jon Bakija, Social Welfare, Income Inequality, and Tax Progressivity: A Primer
on Modern Economic Theory and Evidence,
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/bakija/BakijaSocialWelfarelncomelnequalityAndTaxP
rogressivity.pdf (noting that optimal income taxation in the economic literature is focused
on addressing the question of how to maximize social welfare) [https://perma.cc/3LSP-
UUH5]. "The classical economists, especially the three most famous of them, Adam
Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, were utilitarians." JOHN PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH
UTILITARIANS 111 (1949).
61. Much of the discussion in contemporary tax policy begins from utilitarian
premises, even when those premises go unacknowledged. See Fleischer, supra text
accompanying note 16; Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model,
64 TAX L. REv. 229, 230 (2011).
62. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS (2008) (presenting a unified framework for evaluating and analyzing
taxation).
63. See generally The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [https://perma.cc/RN6Y-46UC] (last
updated Sept. 22, 2014) (providing a history of Utilitarianism, starting with Bentham and
Mill to the modem day refinements of the philosophy).
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A. Classical Utilitarianism
Versions of the utilitarian ethical theory date as far back as
Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus .64 The unifying characteristic of
utilitarian theories is the idea that, rather than make a priori
claims about the rightness or wrongness of any particular action,
ethical evaluations should be consequentialist.65 That is to say,
for utilitarians, ethics is primarily a process of examining the
outcomes (usually the expected outcomes, rather than the actual
outcomes, since ethical decisions must be made in advance of
knowing the actual outcome of the choice) of actions and
determining whether those outcomes tend towards the goal of
the ethical theory.66 On a consequentialist model, actions cannot
be evaluated in the abstract, and actions should not be evaluated
based on the motivations behind them.67 Rather, what makes an
action "right" for a consequentialist, as an ethical matter, is the
degree to which that action achieves the desired ethical end.68
The utilitarian version of consequentialism evaluates the
64. "Though Bentham is usually cited as the founder of utilitarianism, the
antecedents of utilitarian principles have a far older vintage in the philosophy of Plato,
Aristotle, and Epicurus, and in early Christian thought. Other significant dimensions of the
theory can be traced to the seventeenth-century writings of Hobbes, Locke, and Richard
Cumberland." JAMES E. CRIMMINS, ON BENTHAM 2-3 (2004).
65. "Utilitarianism is often described as a consequentialist theory ... A non-
consequentialist theory, such as Kantian ethics, will claim that certain actions are just
wrong in themselves, and not wrong because of their consequences for happiness or
anything else. But consequentialist theories make the rightness of actions depend on their
consequences. Kantian ethics may claim that murder is wrong in itself, while utilitarianism
will claim that it is wrong only because of its consequences (the decrease in overall
happiness brought about by the absence of the person killed, by the grief, distress, anxiety
caused to others, and so on)." Roger Crisp, Introduction to J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 14
(Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1861).
66. Utilitarianism is not the only consequentialist theory, but it may be the best
known. Other examples of consequentialism include pragmatism, hedonism, and egoism.
Consequentialism, ETHICS GUIDE,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/consequentialism_1.shtml; Consequentialism,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
[https://perma.cc/2CLV-5GPK] (last updated Oct. 22, 2015). There is some debate about
how broadly or narrowly to define consequentialism, but there is at least general agreement
about one central element of all consequentialist theories. "Any consequentialist theory
must accept the claim that ... certain normative properties depend only on consequences.
If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be consequentialist." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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rightness and wrongness of actions by the degree to which those
actions increase utility.69
1. Jeremy Bentham
In many ways, although John Stuart Mill is its most famous
advocate, Jeremy Bentham is thought of as the father of
utilitarianism.70 And, at least at the beginning of his
philosophical career, Mill saw himself as extending and building
on the work of Jeremy Bentham, a friend of Mill's father, and
something of a mentor to Mill himself.71 A social revolutionary,
Bentham believed that measuring the good in terms of human
happiness was not only more scientifically accurate than
references to idealist criteria, but also that appeals to happiness
would democratize society.72 The targets of his philosophical
critique included, to a certain extent, idealists like Immanuel
Kant, but also, to a greater extent, the traditional values
espoused by most religious thinkers.7 3 In this regard, Bentham
is the philosophical heir to David Hume's empiricism.7 Like
most consequentialist thinkers, Bentham believed that ethical
analyses begin with facts about the world.7 Actions have
consequences in the empirical world, and it is to that world that
we must look to determine whether or not an action is ethical.7 6
69. At the heart of debates among those who hold utilitarian ethical beliefs is the
definition of "utility." The History of Utilitarianism , supra note 63. Section A of this Part
of the article explores what Mill meant by utility. Section B examines the form "utility"
takes in the language of welfare economists. Finally, Section C highlights the differences
between these two approaches.
70. Kiran Bhardwaj, Higher and Lower Pleasures and our Moral Psychology, 1 RES
COGITANS 126, 126 (2010).
71. "Mill saw himself as an advocate, and evangelist even, for utilitarianism, telling
us later that he never gave up the greatest happiness principle . . . One of his first moves
was to establish a group of fellow sympathizers, which met in a disused room at Bentham's
house." ROGER CRISP, MILL ON UTILITARIANISM 4 (1997).
72. See ROSS ABBINNETT, POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: CONNECTING THE
PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF HEGEL, NIETZSCHE AND DERRIDA TO THE POLITICAL
IDEOLOGIES OF HAPPINESS 22 (2013).
73. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 18, 21, 25 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
74. Hume was one of the first philosophical empiricists, insisting that philosophy,
like the other natural sciences, must begin all analysis with facts from the world, rather
than with ideas. 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 7-8 (E.P. Dutton & Co.,
Inc. 1911) (1739).
75. See BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 74.
76. See id.
Much of the ethical debate until this point had focused on an
evaluation of motives and intentions, judging an action as good
or bad on the basis of the thoughts behind it, rather than based
on the results it produced.77 Furthermore, ethics had focused on
the good of the community, but Bentham objected that the good
of the community could only mean the good of all of the
individual members of the community.7 ' This turned ethical
calculations into a balancing act, totaling the consequences to
each individual member of society when determining the most
ethical action.79 Rather than speaking in abstract terms about the
good of "mankind" or "society," Bentham focused on real
people and the way a particular action impacted the lives of
those people." Bentham insisted that ethics must focus on all
the consequences of an action for people in the world."
However, this emphasis does not yet clarify what makes an
action good or bad.
The next step of Bentham's argument was to establish what
it means to talk of the "good" of individuals.82 Again, Bentham
disagreed with the arguments of traditional thinkers in this
discussion of ethics. "A thing is said to promote the interest, or
to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the
sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to
diminish the sum total of his pains."8 3 For Bentham, the first
philosopher to robustly articulate the ethics of utilitarianism, an
action is deemed ethical if it promotes pleasure and diminishes
84pain. Bentham ultimately equated utility with pleasure and
claimed that ethical calculations should determine the amount of
77. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC
OF MORALS 64 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 2005) (1948).
78. "The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can
occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it
has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual
persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the
community then is, what? - the sum of the interests of the several members who compose
it." BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 12.
79. Id. at 12-13,40.
80. See id. at 12.
81. See id. at 40.
82. See id. at 12, 125.
83. BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 12.
84. See id. at 11-12.
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pleasure produced by an action." When compared to the
philosophers of his time, who made ethical arguments with
appeals to reason, or God, or natural rights, Bentham's work
looks radical. Grounded firmly in the world of experience,
Bentham refuses to make non-empirical judgments about the
"quality" of an interest, instead insisting that happiness and
pleasure are all just matters of degree." All pleasure is equally
valuable, so more pleasure is just better.87
In order to understand the way in which Mill's utilitarian
calculus differs from Bentham's, one must first understand what
Bentham means by saying an action increases pleasure. First of
all, unlike Mill, Bentham endorsed a theoretically consistent
version of ethical hedonism." Bentham argued that all pleasure
was equal, and that ethics had nothing to say about the value of
one form of pleasure over another.8 9 Bentham's philosophical
account included the explication of a utilitarian calculus, meant
to analyze the rightness and wrongness of actions with reference
to the extent to which the action tended to produce more
85. Id.
86. Among even those who admire Bentham's work, there is a concern that he is
fundamentally wrong about his position that all pleasure is the same. For instance, "He
saw an analogy where there was none. He also confused measurements of quantity with
comparisons of effects. When a man has to choose between two alternative pleasures, one
of which is mild but lasting and the other intense but brief, he never can choose the greater,
for the simple reason that neither is the greater. What he can do, however, is to choose the
one he desires the more intensely." PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 74. However, this flaw
is remedied in Mill's version of utilitarianism. See MILL, supra note 65, at 56.
87. See PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 73.
88. Hedonism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ [https://perma.cc/CJ9E-9EEB] (published April
20, 2004 and substantially revised October 17, 2013). Again, although he is consistent,
Bentham may also be wrong. Treating all pleasure as inherently the same ignores real
differences that seem to have effects on how that pleasure is experienced in the world.
"The intensity of a pleasure cannot be measured against its duration, nor its duration
against its certainty or uncertainty, nor this latter property against its propinquity or
remoteness." PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 74.
89. Bentham refuses to categorize kinds of pleasure, and instead measures pleasure
(and pain) by variations in degree. But pleasure as such is one kind of thing, capable only
of differences in degree, not in kind. "By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the
present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is
considered." BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 12.
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pleasure.90 Again, for Bentham, because all pleasures are of
equal worth, the difference between more or less worthy actions
is the degree to which the actions produce more or less pleasure,
and the degree to which that pleasure is more or less intense.
Bentham then argues that, in effect, ethics must perform a
calculus with regard to all ethical decisions, totaling up the value
(including the relative degrees of intensity) of all pleasures and
pains produced by choosing one action and comparing the result
to the pleasures and pains (again, including the intensity of those
pleasures and pains) produced by an alternative action.92
Comparison of the results will then determine the correct ethical
choice.93
2. John Stuart Mill
While Mill claims to be continuing Bentham's
utilitarianism, Mill ultimately disagrees with Bentham's pure
hedonism.94 Some pleasures are more valuable than others, Mill
argues, but the only arbiter of the value of two distinct pleasures,
is someone who has experienced them both.95 Mill goes on to
90. "To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by
itself, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances: 1. Its intensity.
2. Its duration. 3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness." Id. at
38.
91. "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves
of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment
or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same
thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness." Id. at 11-12.
92. Id. at 40.
93. Id. at 11-12, 40.
94. "Like Bentham, Mill believes that pleasantness is the only 'good-making'
property. But how valuable a pleasure is depends not only on its duration, but on its
nature." MILL, supra note 65, at 12. "It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to
recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than
others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as
well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity
alone." Id. at 56.
95. "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience
of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer
it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for
any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in
ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as
to render it, in comparison, of small account." Id.
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conclude that the quality of the so-called "higher" pleasures is so
much more intense as to make those pleasures incomparably
better than the "lower" pleasures.96 As he famously claims, "It
is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the
fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only
know their own side of the question."9 7 Some have objected that
this turn away from Bentham's pure hedonism demonstrates an
inconsistency in Mill's theory.98 However, the mere
acknowledgement that pleasure admits of qualitative difference
does not necessarily entail the conclusion that there is some
measure, other than pleasure, that determines value.99 Indeed, as
Mill himself notes, those who criticize the theory of
utilitarianism for valuing pleasure and who claim that pleasure is
nothing but a "base value" reveal more about their own
understanding of pleasure, than they do about the coherence of
utilitarianism.o
At the center of Mill's theory of utilitarianism, and the
element that makes utilitarianism more than merely an ethics of
self-interest, is that, when one calculates how any particular
action will maximize happiness, one must not privilege one's
own happiness over that of any other person.'o All human
beings have equal value when calculating how much happiness
there is in the world.10 2 Therefore, even an action that threatens
96. Id. at 57.
97. Id.
98. MILL, supra note 65, at 12.
99. "If a man were to say that nothing is beautiful except colour and then to place the
colours in an order of beauty, it would not follow that he was admitting that anything but
colour could be beautiful. The difference between one colour and another is not a
difference of degree, nor yet is it a difference in respect of anything except colour. So, too,
the higher and the lower pleasures, though different in kind, may yet differ only in respect
of pleasure." Id. at 137.
100. Discussing the Epicureans response to those who alleged their belief system as
a "doctrine worthy only of swine," Mill points out, "Epicureans have always answered, that
it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the
accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which
swine are capable." Id. at 55.
101. "[Impartiality] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-
Happiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification,
unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made
for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's." Id. at 105.
102. "[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in
conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own
714
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to impose pain on one individual or on a group of individuals
might still be held to be ethical on a utilitarian calculus, as long
as the totality of pleasure created by the action exceeds that
pain.103 It is this universal nature of the utilitarian calculus that
makes taxation ethically possible, since the "pain" imposed by
the government collecting the tax will be offset by the pleasure
created by the services the government provides with the
revenue. 104
Mill's emphasis that there are higher and lower pleasures,
and that the higher pleasures are more ethically valuable than the
lower ones, serves as the basis for thinking that Mill is
concerned with more than just self-interest.'o Mill goes on to
explain that, for example, "justice" is nothing more than a higher
pleasure that must be included in the utilitarian calculus. os
Justice is a term used regularly in most discussion of ethics."o'
But Mill argues that justice has no meaning outside of the
utilitarian calculus. Valuing "justice," even giving it absolute
dominance over all other values, only demonstrates that what we
call justice must be given great worth in the utilitarian
calculus.ios Justice is nothing but a surfeit of pleasure produced
by certain actions.109 Part of what often gets left out of
discussions of the utilitarian calculus is Mill's belief that, if
people are, in fact, highly moral, then they will get pleasure
happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
disinterested and benevolent spectator." Id. at 64.
103. Mill acknowledges that, in some instances, the good of others can only be
achieved by the sacrifices of some. "Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the
world's arrangements that anyone can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute
sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge
that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in
man." MILL, supra note 65, at 63.
104. Consequentialism, supra note 66. Mill discusses taxation towards the end of
Utilitarianism, primarily by criticizing non-consequentialist analyses of the justice of
taxation. MILL, supra note 65, at 102. Mill claims that the only way out of the debate
about the appropriate way to tax is with the application of utilitarian principles. Id.
Having pointed out that some theories of justice will demand equal taxation from all, and
others will require graduated tax, Mill states "[firom these confusions there is no other
mode of extrication than the utilitarian." Id.
105. MILL, supra note 65, at 57.
106. Seeid.atl06.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 93.
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from helping others.o A world that is just, by utilitarian
measures, will tend towards equality, as those with means will
experience happiness by sharing what they have with those who
have less.'
One consequence of Mill's theory of utilitarianism for
theories of government and social justice generally is that the
best forms of government will be those that align the well-being
of individuals with that of society as a whole.1 2 When the
choices that produce the most happiness for individuals also lead
to the most happiness for all members of society, then
individuals need not engage in a difficult moral calculus in
determining the best action.1 3  Instead, the choice of which
action is most ethically appropriate will be obvious. Mill
believes that the power to align these interests effectively lies
with the government. 114
[L]aws and social arrangements should place the
happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called)
the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in
harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly,
that education and opinion, which have so vast a power
over human character, should so use that power as to
establish in the mind of every individual an
indissoluble association between his own happiness
and the good of the whole; especially between his own
happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct,
negative and positive, as regard for the universal
happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be
unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to
himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the
general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote
the general good may be in every individual one of the
habitual motives of action, and the sentiments
110. "[I1n a properly constituted world, the individual's happiness will be found in
doing what is morally right." MILL, supra note 65, at 5.
111. "The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the
sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum
total of happiness, it considers as wasted." Id. at 63-64.
112. Id.at65-66.
113. Id. at 66.
114. Id. at 64.
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connected therewith may fill a large and prominent
place in every human being's sentient existence. 1
That is to say, it is the task of the government to arrange
affairs so that individuals see their incentives as aligned with the
good of the whole, rather than in conflict with that good. When
members of a society understand that their utility is increased in
concert with the utility of the rest of the world, then they are
more likely to make choices that increase total utility, and are
therefore moral choices, on utilitarian grounds.
Since the ethical discourse of his day focused primarily on
the language of justice and fairness, Mill spends a fair amount of
his text contemplating what utilitarianism implies for notions of
justice. On Mill's account, a strict application of utilitarian
principles, where each individual's happiness counts the same as
any other's, and where the higher pleasures, including those
produced by social equality and fairness are preferred over the
lower pleasures, will necessarily lead to a just society. 16
Towards the end of Utilitarianism, Mill makes a prescient
comment about the nature of justice in society. Observing that
social norms about acceptable differences in treatment evolve
over time, Mill contemplates the evolution of the understanding
of justice in society within the utilitarian framework.'17 Because
utilitarianism demands that each individual be able to seek the
maximization of happiness in the world, including his own
individual happiness, utilitarianism contemplates in everyone
"an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as
the inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest
in which that of every individual is included, sets limits to the
maxim ... .""' Mill goes on to note that the evolution of justice
in society reflects just this reality." 9 People have been given the
freedom to pursue their own happiness, unless and until that
pursuit infringes on others. Society regularly imposes
restrictions on the ability of certain groups or individuals to
pursue their own happiness. As society evolves, those
restrictions evolve as well, and we often identify as "unjust"
115. MILL, supra note 65, at 64.
116. Id. at 106.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 106-07.
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what we previously saw as merely expedient.120 Mill
emphasizes that a focus on maximizing social utility might
allow us to avoid the kind of expediency that results in social
norms we later identify as unjust.12 1 The utilitarian standard
treats all individuals as equally valuable, and Mill thinks this
treatment might avoid the kind of injustice that has evolved
under other ethical theories.122
Mill's theory of utilitarianism creates a set of ethical rules
based on the measuring of pleasures and pains across a society.
Mill ultimately holds that there are meaningful differences
between the higher and lower pleasures, and that among the
higher pleasures are those that tend towards equality and
justice.12 And since motives are irrelevant, from an ethical
perspective, laws can and should create ethical behavior by
mandating happiness-producing actions.124
120. MILL, supra note 65, at 106.
All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when
some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all
social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume
the character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so
tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been
tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities
under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which
would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they
have at last learnt to condemn. The entire history of social improvement has
been a series of transitions, by which one custom or institution after another,
from being a supposed primary necessity of social existence, has passed into
the rank of an universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been
with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and
plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of
colour, race, and sex.
Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 56.
124. MILL, supra note 65, at 64.
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B. Welfare Economics
Just as in its intellectual forebear, "utility" is the
fundamental measure of value in the welfare economic model.125
While "utility" is the unified concept at the foundation of the
economic calculus, welfare economists have also taken from
Mill's utilitarianism the notion that not all "utility" is the
same. 126 This view that not all happiness is equally valuable
becomes manifest in the form of the theory of declining
marginal utility.1 27  Economists generally claim that it is
impossible, in the abstract, to determine what provides utility to
individual people.128 We have no way to see inside the minds of
members of society, and doing thorough empirical research on
the happiness producing outcomes of all members of society is
impossible. However, economics does not abandon the
fundamental empiricism of the utilitarian theory.129 We must
make judgments about utility based only on the information
available to us. Economics therefore focuses on the "expressed
preferences" of members of society in order to determine
utility. 30 Most economic theories endorse the view that the
125. As Louis Kaplow explains it, "The welfare economic approach to social
assessment . . . determines the effects of any policy under consideration on each
individual's utility - also referred to as an individual's well-being or welfare. Thus ...
positive analysis entails identifying policies' consequences for each individual. Second, to
form a social assessment, the information on everyone's utility is aggregated using a
[social welfare function (SWF)], in particular an individualistic SWF, indicating that social
welfare is a function (only) of individuals' utilities." KAPLOW, supra note 62, at 37.
126. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (discussing the different perspectives of utility in welfare
economics).
127. Declining marginal utility is a fundamental premise of contemporary welfare
economics, and, indeed, is considered so fundamental that is incorporated into introductory
textbooks on the subject (although it is not a premise adopted by all economists). See, e.g.,
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 447 (Joseph Sabatino et al. eds.,
2012).
128. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 113-14 (1979).
129. See id. at 107.
130. See generally Bryan Norton, Robert Costanza, and Richard C. Bishop, The
Evolution of Preferences: Why "Sovereign" Preferences May Not Lead to Sustainable
Policies and What to Do about It, 24 Ecological Econ. 193, 201 (1998) ("[Cllaims that
people do not behave according to the dictates of utility theory are particularly troubling to
economists, whose theories assume that people are rational in the sense of having
preferences that are complete and transitive and in the sense that they choose what they
most prefer.") (internal quotations omitted).
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most easily calculable expression of preferences is the use of
money.131 Therefore, welfare economic theorists conclude that it
is reasonable to use money as a substitute for utility.1 32  While
examining the financial choices people make in an attempt to
identify their utility preferences might give us some insight into
their individual utilitarian calculus, even limiting utility to a
monetary calculus does not allow those seeking to apply welfare
economic analysis to an issue to get a clear universalizable
result. Individuals have different preferences, even with regard
to something as universal as money. Retrieving reliable
empirical information about those differing preferences is
difficult, so welfare economics makes simplifying assumptions
about the preferences of individuals.133 The primary simplifying
assumption economists make is that everyone desires more
money (utility).134 Therefore the action that produces more
money will typically be the better action, according to a welfare
economic analysis.135
131. "[W]e can determine what people care about by what they buy and do not buy."
Neil H. Buchanan, The Role of Economics in Tax Scholarship, in BEYOND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 11, 21 (David A. Brennen et al. eds., 2013).
132. See KAPLOW, supra note 62, at 359.
It is familiar to economists that well-being or utility (the terms are used
interchangeably throughout) is a broad, subjective notion, not one limited to
material pleasures, hedonistic enjoyment, or any other a priori class of
pleasures and pains. Resources, often measured in monetary units, are
means to obtain goods and services; these, in turn, are means to generating
utility, which may be derived directly from goods or indirectly and
intangibly, such as through fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for family and
friends, aesthetic enjoyment of art or the environment, and so forth.
KAPLOW, supra note 62, at 359.
[L]egal scholars have traditionally tried to avoid specifically defining what
constitutes utility, happiness, or well-being. Instead, legal scholars use
proxies such as liberty and money, which are thought to influence happiness
or well-being, regardless of the precise way in which happiness or well-
being is defined. To that end, utilitarianism as traditionally applied in tax
policy uses income or wealth as a proxy for utility and assumes the
declining marginal utility thereof ....
Fleischer, supra note 16, at 1505 (footnotes omitted). "[I1t may not be possible to measure
utility at all." Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy,
95 MINN. L. REV. 904,909 (2011).
133. See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 905.
134. See Posner, supra note 128, at 119.
135. Id.
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However, welfare economists also recognize that not all
money is equal to all people.13 6 A dollar is worth much more to
the person with only fifty dollars to her name than it is to Bill
Gates. The idea that a dollar is worth more to someone with less
overall is known as declining marginal utility.'3 7 "Marginal
utility" is the usefulness of the last item, in comparison to the
item immediately before it.'38 If one's marginal utility declines,
then the last item is less useful than the second to last item. 3 9
This theory of the declining marginal value of money, and its
extension to a theory of declining marginal utility more broadly,
is generally accepted by welfare economists .140 Declining
marginal utility allows economic theory to incorporate a social
welfare component by arguing that the allocation of goods
between higher and lower income members of society can
include an estimation of the value of those goods to each
potential recipient.' 4 ' If the theory of declining marginal utility
indicates that a particular good will be less valuable to the
higher income (or higher wealth) individual, then the utilitarian
goal can be met by allocating that good to the lower income (or
lower wealth) individual.1 42  This theory of declining marginal
utility justifies progressive taxation, of both the income and
wealth transfer variety.1"' Because the last dollar earned by the
wealthier individual provides little value to her, the government
can take that dollar, in the form of a tax, and transfer it to a less
wealthy individual, usually in the form of services, but
sometimes in the form of a direct financial transfer, as in the
'44
refundable income tax credits aimed at low income taxpayers.
136. MANKIW, supra note 127.
137. See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 915.
138. Id.
139. Id. "[D]eclining marginal utility of income means each dollar is worth less than
the dollar before. ('Marginal' utility of income refers, of course, to the utility of the dollar
'at the margin,' that is, the last dollar.)" Id.
140. "The assumption of declining marginal utility of income - that the next dollar a
person receives is "worth less" to a wealthy person than a poor person - has been crucial in
tax scholarship over the last sixty or so years, as optimal tax theory and welfarism have
become important ways that many in the legal academy evaluate tax policy." Id. at 904.
141. See MANKIW, supra note 127.
142. See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 917.
143. See id.
144. For an explanation and discussion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is
the largest direct transfer to low-income taxpayers through the Federal Income Tax, see
generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who's Afraid of Redistribution? An Analysis of the Earned
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C. Classical Utilitarianism Is Not Welfare Economics
As should now be clear, there are significant differences
between classical utilitarianism and its modem-day
interpretation in welfare economics. In an attempt to simplify
the utilitarian calculus and make it useful in determining real-
world policies, including tax policies, welfare economics has left
behind Mill's view that higher pleasures, like the pleasures of
justice and equality, must be valued more highly in determining
the correct course of action. 4 While more sophisticated
versions of welfare economics include a "social welfare
function" that can incorporate the values of justice and equality
as values a society holds,146 most welfare economists do not
endorse the view held by Mill that those values are, in fact,
more valuable than other values.147 This resistance to ranking
preferences, outside of the ranking permitted by applying a
theory of declining marginal utility, makes it harder to justify
equality-producing laws on a welfare economic basis.148
What makes Millian utilitarianism a more robust ethical
theory than a simple "greatest good for the greatest number"
arithmetic calculation is that Mill believed that the higher
pleasures received additional weight in that ethical
calculation. 14 9 Because not all pleasures are alike, determining
the correct utilitarian outcome requires not just determining the
raw number of pleasures produced by an action, nor even
comparing the intensity and duration of those pleasures, as
Bentham would claim."'o Mill's theory introduces the idea that
Income Tax Credit 74 Mo. L. REV. 251 (2009) (presenting the history of the EITC through
its current form, reviewing its critics, and proposing adjustments).
145. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 979-80 (2001).
146. For an explanation of the role of the social welfare function, see KAPLOW,
supra note 62.
147. See Guido Calabresi, Of Tastes and Values, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 316
(2014).
148. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85, 88 (1985).
149. See MILL, supra note 65, at 56.
150. See id.; Jeremy Bentham, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entriesfbenthamI/ [https://perma.cc/M83U-K4BJ] (published
March 17, 2015) (describing Bentham's "felicific calculus," which "[t]o an individual the
value of a pain or pleasure will be more or less according to its intensity, duration, ... ")
(internal quotations omitted).
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pleasures of a higher order must be preferred above the lower
pleasures.'' And included in those higher pleasures are the
social goods we identify as justice and equality.152 Because
these pleasures are of such a greater magnitude than the lower
pleasure of satisfying self-interest, much social policy and law
could be designed to achieve the higher pleasures of justice and
equality. While the use of the social welfare function in welfare
economics goes some way towards allowing the utilitarian
calculus to prefer certain kinds of pleasure (or utility) over
others, welfare economics does not go so far as to say that some
forms of utility are by their very nature to be preferred over
others.153
Of course, one objection to Millian utilitarianism is that
Mill claims that some pleasures are greater and more valuable
than others without providing any criteria by which to determine
which pleasures those are.'54 His elitist claim that Socrates and
his ilk are better judges than the lowly pig of what true pleasure
is gives us some insight into Mill's beliefs regarding the higher
and lower pleasures, but very little information about how the
utilitarian calculus ought to be applied in society.' Welfare
economics responds by leaving this element of Mill's theory out
of its take-up of utilitarianism,s6 but by leaving this element
behind, welfare economics loses some of the ethical force of
Mill's original theory. There may be legitimate objections to the
argument that some pleasures are more meaningful and valuable
than others, but abandoning that portion of the theory without
replacing it with another element risks making the theory
unintelligible.
151. See MILL, supra note 65, at 59.
152. Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ mill-moral-political/ [https://perma.cc/K4SR-XNTQ]
(published October 9, 2007 and substantially revised August 22, 2014) ("Justice implies
something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual
person can claim from us as a matter of right.").
153. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 145, at 979-80.
154. See Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 152 ("[E]ven if we can
distinguish higher and lower pleasures, according to their causes, it remains unclear how
the hedonist is to explain how higher pleasures are inherently more pleasurable.").
155. See MILL, supra note 65, at 57.
156. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 145, at 979-80.
2016]1 723
724 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:695
IV. WHAT DOES UTILITARIANISM SAY ABOUT
WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION?
At the heart of Mill's ethical argument is a belief that the
moral actor experiences pleasure, and therefore makes ethical
choices, by performing the action that promotes the good of the
entire community, rather than based solely on his own self-
interest.' At first glance this might seem to indicate that a
moral society does not need wealth transfer taxation, since
individuals acting in accordance with utilitarian ethical theory
will make choices about the distribution of their wealth that will
tend towards an increase in the happiness of the entire society.
The natural goals of all individuals to maximize their own utility
will lead them to redistribute their own wealth, making direct
transfers to those members of society who have less, until
society becomes more or less equal. With this sort of self-
motivated redistribution, one of the central functions of taxation
would be eliminated.' However, Mill does not expect that all
individuals will share the appropriate utilitarian motivation from
the outset." 9 We are, as Mill notes, becoming more ethical, and
since utilitarianism is an empirical approach, more information
157. MILL, supra note 65, at 64.
[U]tility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place
the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of
every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the
whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a
power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the
mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own
happiness and the good of the whole .. . so that not only he may be unable
to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with
conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to
promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual
motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large
and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence.
Id.
158. Federal tax performs several functions, many of which could not be achieved
merely by relying on self-motivated redistribution, such as military spending,
environmental and investment regulation, or foreign policy. However, one motivation for
taxation, and especially for progressive taxation (including the estate tax) and spending
programs aimed at the least well-off members of society, is the goal of having a more
equitable distribution of wealth in society. See TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME
INEQUALITY 2-3 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994).
159. See MILL, supra note 65, at 70.
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But until individuals become sufficiently aware of their own
utility and how best to maximize happiness (by recognizing that
a more equal society promotes the most happiness, says Mill),
we may need laws that encourage us to act in a way that is most
likely to produce that happiness. And importantly, Mill's
consequentialist ethics is unconcerned with motives, counting as
ethical an action that increases overall happiness, whether or not
that action is motivated by a desire on the part of the actor to act
ethically.161 Consequentialist ethical theories concern
themselves only with the result of an action, such that "ethical
intentions" count for little to nothing in consequentialist
theories.162 Mill's utilitarian ethics counts as ethical any action
that does, in fact, increase utility/happiness, whether or not the
intention of * the actor is to increase utility/happiness.163
Therefore, if it were demonstrated that any particular
government plan would increase overall happiness, then
analyzing that plan from the utilitarian perspective would lead to
an endorsement of that plan. For purposes of this article, the
question to be considered is whether or not adopting
utilitarianism would lead to the endorsement of a system of
wealth transfer taxation. If a heavily redistributive wealth
transfer taxation did, in fact, increase overall happiness, then a
utilitarian analysis would endorse that tax.
In determining whether or not utilitarianism leads to the
conclusion that wealth transfer taxation is ethically justified, one
must consider another essential element of Mill's classical
160. See id.
161. See MILL, supra note 65, at 65.
[Critics of utilitarianism] say it is exacting too much to require that people
shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of
society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and
to confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of
ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but
no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a
feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundreths of all our actions are
done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not
condemn them. [T]he motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action ....
Id.
162. Id. at 14.
163. Id. at 65.
UTILITARIANISM 7252016]
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:695
utilitarian calculus-the fact that not all pleasures are equally
valuable. Classical utilitarianism is still primarily empirical, so
performing a utilitarian calculus does, to a certain extent, depend
upon empirical evidence of the utility provided in various
scenarios. Empirical research on the effects of various wealth
transfer tax schemes is outside of the scope of this project.
Despite that, there is evidence examining the general well-being
of societies with more or less equitable distributions of wealth.164
Sophisticated welfare economics research does include these
insights in determining the utility of particular actions."'
Utilitarianism would require this weighing of pleasures as well.
Because some pleasures are higher than others, the utilitarian
calculus must weight those particular sources of pleasure more
heavily. Therefore, evaluations of wealth transfer taxation that
consider only the utility of the decedent/donor or the heir, or
evaluations that consider those utilities in comparison with the
utility of a more equitable society, but give all those estimations
of utility equal weight, will miss the point of classical
utilitarianism. Mill claimed that the quality of higher pleasures
like justice and equality were so intense as to make them
infinitely more valuable than any other source of pleasure.166
Since robust utilitarianism evaluates pleasures based not merely
on their intensity or duration, but also on the quality of the
pleasure, it does not go too far to say that utilitarianism is
consistent with robust redistribution. While this redistribution
could be achieved through other methods of taxation, using
wealth transfer taxation to effect that redistribution targets the
tax at combating the concentration of wealth in a way that
income taxation does not.16 7
While it seems evident that utilitarianism is consistent with
and, indeed, might even demand heavily redistributive taxation,
without more empirical evidence regarding the effect of
different forms of taxation on the utility of those involved, it is
164. Mill himself, writing 150 years ago, believed society was poised to wipe out
poverty and the suffering it caused. "Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be
completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and
providence of individuals." Id. at 62.
165. See James R. Repetti, Should We Tax the Gratuitous Transfer of Wealth? An
Introduction, 57 B.C. L. REV. 815, 817-18 (2016).
166. See MILL, supra note 65, at 98.
167. See Moran, supra note 28, at 329.
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difficult to say what form that redistributive taxation should
take. There are reasons to believe that wealth transfer taxation
does more in a more direct way to combat unequal wealth
distributions than do other forms of tax, such as income or
consumption taxes. However, even within the category of
wealth transfer taxation there are many possible options for
organizing the tax. An inheritance or accessions tax would
impose a tax on the recipient of the transfer, which is likely the
best way to achieve more equality of outcome, especially if the
revenue raised from the tax is then used to increase opportunities
available to the least well-off members of society."' However,
even an estate and gift tax system like the one currently in place
in the United States-if the exemption levels were reduced, if
the rates were increased, and if the valuations were more
robustly enforced-could increase utility and happiness by
decreasing the concentration of wealth and increasing social
justice. Achieving this utilitarian ethical result would depend on
using the revenue raised through the estate and gift taxes to
achieve a more equitable society, which would balance the cost
of any pain produced by the imposition of the tax. 6 9
168. For a discussion of the role of inheritance taxation in increasing equality of
opportunity, see Bird-Pollan, supra text accompanying note 6. For a discussion of the use
of an accessions tax to combat the intergenerational transfer of political power, see
generally Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to Combat Dynastic
Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2016), proposing that an accessions tax is superior
to other options for taxing wealth transfers in achieving the goal of minimizing dynastic
wealth transfers.
169. A utilitarian may be especially drawn to the use of an estate tax to achieve these
redistributive goals, since the tax is only collected after the death of the taxpayer.
Therefore, the pain suffered by that taxpayer is only the pain of the anticipation of paying
the tax, rather than the actual pain or unhappiness experienced by paying the tax. Of
course, the heir to the wealth may feel some unhappiness knowing that her inheritance is
smaller, due to the burden of the tax, but that pain might also be mitigated by the
knowledge that the legal system allows the inheritance to proceed, thereby enriching the
heir with the wealth of the decedent. See generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Why Tax Wealth
Transfers: A Philosophical Analysis, 57 B.C. L. REV. 859 (2016) (applying philosophical
analysis to the question of wealth transfer taxation and proposing that "a robust system of
wealth transfer taxation is best suited to combat . . . inequality in the twenty-first century"
and that "wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most philosophical belief systems").
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the current state of wealth
transfer taxation in the United States and applied the
utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill to an analysis of wealth
transfer taxation more broadly. This utilitarian analysis is an
important step in the tax policy debate, as many U.S.
taxpayer/voters, as well as numerous tax policy scholars,
embrace utilitarianism as a philosophical approach. A utilitarian
analysis that demonstrates that robust wealth transfer taxation is
endorsed by a theoretically consistent utilitarian philosophy
moves the conversation about the future of the estate tax
forward. Much political debate about the estate and gift tax
system is mired in convoluted and confused versions of poor
philosophical argumentation. This article clarifies the utilitarian
view, and carefully applies that view to the arguments around
wealth transfer taxation.
Because the utilitarian calculus espoused by Mill permits a
ranking of pleasures, valuing "higher" pleasures more than
"lower" pleasures, and because equality and justice are higher
pleasures on Mill's analysis, taxation that redistributes wealth in
order to create a more equal society will be judged ethical under
Mill's utilitarianism. While this redistribution need not
necessarily come in the form of wealth transfer taxation, under
the current system of taxation in the United States, the taxation
of wealth transfers is the most heavily redistributive tax,
collecting tax only from the wealthiest members of society, and,
primarily, only after they have died. While a utilitarian
evaluation of the current federal wealth transfer taxes must
consider the loss of utility felt by the individual subject to the
tax, and by any heir who receives a smaller inheritance as a
result of the tax, those will be lower pains, insufficient to offset
the higher pleasure of increased social equality.
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